A small tattoo on the leg of a candidate for the Italian Police may seem completely unrelated to the issue of Italian citizenship by descent. Yet today both matters are before the same European institution, the Court of Justice of the European Union, and there is a legally significant point of connection between them. In both cases, Italy is exercising a power that belongs to it. In the first, it organizes its police forces and sets the requirements for recruitment and the use of uniforms. In the second, it regulates the rules governing the acquisition of Italian citizenship. The real question, however, is how far that national power may be exercised when its effects enter an area protected by European Union law.

The case of the Italian policewoman

The case concerns a candidate who was excluded from a competition to join the Italian police because she had a small tattoo on the lower part of her leg. Italian rules prohibit visible tattoos when an officer is wearing the uniform. At the same time, for certain official ceremonies, the female uniform provided for a skirt and shoes that left the area of the tattoo exposed. It was precisely the combination of those rules that led to the candidate’s exclusion.

In the conclusions presented before the Court of Justice, Advocate General Tamara Ćapeta considered that this situation gives rise to a difference in treatment based on sex. Had the candidate been a man, the tattoo in that area of the leg would have been covered by the male uniform and would not have led to exclusion from the competition. The most interesting aspect, however, lies in the way the issue was analysed. Italy is entitled to establish rules for access to its police forces, and that is not in dispute. The question then becomes whether the measure adopted is appropriate, necessary and proportionate to the objective pursued.

The Italian authorities relied on reasons connected with tradition, institutional identity and participation in official ceremonies. The Advocate General, however, considered that those arguments were not sufficient to justify such a serious consequence as permanently preventing the candidate from entering the police profession. Less restrictive solutions were available. A policewoman could, for example, be allowed to wear trousers during certain ceremonies. According to the conclusions, the disadvantage suffered by the candidate, namely being prevented from joining the police, was disproportionate to the essentially symbolic benefit resulting from that particular uniform requirement.

This reasoning also deserves attention from those currently following the reform of Italian citizenship.

What does this have to do with Italian citizenship?

More than it may initially seem. In July 2026, the Italian Constitutional Court referred to the Court of Justice of the European Union a preliminary question concerning Article 3-bis of Law No. 91 of 1992, introduced by the 2025 citizenship reform. The new provision establishes that, in certain circumstances, persons born abroad who hold another citizenship are to be regarded as never having acquired Italian citizenship, except in the cases expressly provided for by law. The rule also applies to persons born before the reform entered into force.

The question sent to Luxembourg is whether Articles 9 of the Treaty on European Union and 20 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union permit legislation of this kind. The Constitutional Court suspended the domestic proceedings and formally referred the matter to the Court of Justice. Once again, therefore, we are dealing with a subject that essentially falls within national competence. It is Italy that determines who its citizens are, but the fact that this competence belongs to the State does not necessarily mean that its exercise is beyond any scrutiny under European law.

This is precisely where the case of the tattooed policewoman becomes relevant.

A legitimate objective does not end the discussion

The citizenship reform was based, among other considerations, on the idea that there should be an effective connection between the individual and Italy. It is entirely possible that the Court of Justice may regard the objective of imposing limits on the transmission of citizenship by descent as legitimate. The difficulty is that recognising the legitimacy of an objective does not automatically make every means used to achieve it legitimate.

In the policewoman’s case, Italy also relied on considerations linked to tradition, uniformity and the identity of the security forces. Even so, the European analysis went further and focused on whether the measure adopted was genuinely necessary. Was it really necessary to exclude that candidate in order to achieve the stated objective? A similar line of reasoning may become relevant in the debate over Italian citizenship. Even if Italy is entitled to require a more effective connection with its citizens, it may still be necessary to examine whether the solution chosen by the legislature was proportionate.

The most delicate issue concerns those who had already been born

This is perhaps the most important aspect of the question currently before the Court of Justice. Article 3-bis is not limited to births occurring after the reform. The preliminary question itself expressly refers to persons born abroad before the new provision entered into force. A person may have been born decades before the legislative change, at a time when a different system governing the transmission of Italian citizenship by descent was in force, and yet the new law may provide that, in certain circumstances, that same person is to be regarded as never having acquired Italian citizenship.

That is very different from simply introducing new conditions for those born after the reform. For that reason, the discussion in Luxembourg does not concern only Italy’s power to change its citizenship rules for the future. It also concerns the effects that new legislation may produce on persons who were already born under a different legal framework.

Were less restrictive solutions available?

The policewoman’s case is significant precisely because the Advocate General did not examine only the objective pursued by the State. She also considered whether there were alternatives capable of achieving the same objective while causing less harm to the individual concerned. A similar question may arise in the field of citizenship.

If the objective was to strengthen the effective connection between the individual and Italy, it would have been possible to imagine a reform applicable only to future births. Broader transitional rules could also have been introduced, or mechanisms capable of taking individual circumstances into account. Elements such as residence in Italy, knowledge of the language, family ties or other objective connections could have been considered. This does not mean that the Italian legislature was legally required to adopt one of those specific solutions. It does mean, however, that the principle of proportionality may require an assessment of whether the measure actually chosen was truly necessary and whether less burdensome alternatives existed. This is exactly the kind of reasoning that appears in the Advocate General’s conclusions in the policewoman’s case.

The question of whether the citizenship already existed

There is also an earlier and probably more complex issue. It will be necessary to determine the legal position of those who were born before the reform. If iure sanguinis citizenship is understood as a status acquired at birth, with subsequent administrative or judicial recognition merely declaring a situation that already existed, the application of the new law to those persons takes on a very different significance.

In that scenario, the issue would not simply concern a person who is now trying to acquire citizenship under new rules. It would concern the present recognition of a legal status linked to a birth that occurred many years earlier. If, on the other hand, the view prevails that such a position was not sufficiently established before formal recognition, the Italian legislature may enjoy a broader margin of action. It is precisely this tension that makes the question before the Court of Justice particularly important.

The same Court facing two very different questions

The two cases should not, of course, be confused. The policewoman’s case concerns discrimination based on sex in access to public employment. The citizenship question concerns the relationship between Italian nationality and citizenship of the European Union. The legal foundations are different. It is also important to remember that, in the policewoman’s case, what has been made public are the Advocate General’s conclusions. The Court of Justice has yet to deliver its final judgment.

For that reason, the case does not allow us to predict how Luxembourg will rule on Italian citizenship. Its significance lies instead in the way European law reviews the exercise of national powers. A matter may continue to belong to the State while at the same time remaining subject to the limits imposed by Union law when the consequences produced go beyond the purely national sphere.

What Luxembourg may say about Italian citizenship

Italy’s competence to establish its own nationality rules is not simply being removed from the State or transferred to the European Union. The question is more specific. It will be necessary to determine how far that competence may be exercised when national legislation affects a status from which citizenship of the European Union also derives.

The case of the tattooed policewoman does not provide the answer, but it offers an interesting perspective on the type of scrutiny the Court of Justice may exercise. It is not enough to ask whether Italy had the power to legislate. It will also be necessary to determine how far Italy could go in exercising that power and whether the consequences chosen by the legislature comply with the limits imposed by European law.

What is now expected is that European justice will prevail over the political and administrative interests of the State and reaffirm that citizenship cannot be reduced to a matter of legislative convenience when rights developed under a previous legal order are at stake.