A recent order issued by the Tribunal of Brescia has made a contradiction visible that deserves attention. On 28 August 2026, the Seventh Civil Section, competent in matters of immigration, international protection and free movement of European Union citizens, postponed to 8 July 2027 the hearings of 51 proceedings, many of them already registered in 2024. In the reasoning, the judge expressly refers to Decree Law No. 100 of 2026, which is also connected with the implementation of the European Union Pact on Migration and Asylum, as well as to the composition of the court’s docket and the office’s priority organisational needs.

The order does not state that Italian citizenship matters are less important than international protection cases, nor does it allow us to conclude that all 51 proceedings listed are iure sanguinis cases. That must be made clear. However, when this reorganisation affects citizenship proceedings, the practical effect is obvious. Those who were already waiting for a judicial decision must continue to wait because the same judicial structure is required to absorb new demands arising from European migration and asylum legislation.

The new urgency also affects those who were already waiting

Italy must comply with the obligations arising from European Union law. Proceedings concerning international protection, detention and personal liberty have clear legal reasons for being handled quickly. The problem is not the fact that these matters are given priority, but that a new urgency is being absorbed by judicial structures that were already overloaded, without sufficient capacity to prevent additional delays in previously pending cases.

That is precisely why the Brescia case is so significant. The Court refers to the new migration legislation and to its own priority organisational needs and, as a consequence, postpones dozens of hearings until July 2027. When citizenship proceedings are among those affected, especially cases filed before the 2025 reform and still governed by the previous legal framework, the result becomes particularly difficult to accept.

These applicants have already turned to the Italian State. They are not waiting for a new citizenship policy. They are waiting for a judge to examine the documents, verify the transmission of citizenship and, where the legal requirements are met, formally declare them Italian under the law applicable to their cases.

Italy is making wait precisely a population it may need

This situation would be concerning in any context. It becomes even more contradictory in light of the demographic data released by the Italian State itself.

ISTAT projections indicate that the population could fall from approximately 58.9 million inhabitants to around 55 million in 2050 and just 45.8 million in 2080. Italy could therefore lose more than 13 million residents, according to a trend that the Institute itself considers practically certain.

Even the projected positive migration balance is not expected to be sufficient to fully offset the losses caused by the difference between births and deaths. Italy therefore needs population, workers, families, professionals, taxpayers and entrepreneurs.

This argument is often used to explain the need for new migration flows. It is a legitimate debate. Precisely for that reason, however, it is difficult to understand why the State does not show the same urgency toward those who already have a historical and family connection with Italy and who may still be formally declared Italian citizens.

A possibility of return that already exists

The descendants of Italians who are currently waiting for judicial decisions live abroad because their ancestors had to leave the country. Wars, poverty, lack of work and lack of opportunities scattered millions of Italian families across the world. The ocean and the passing of generations created distance, but they did not necessarily erase the bond with Italy.

Many of these descendants preserved Italian surnames, family traditions, regional references, customs and some degree of cultural identification with the country. This does not mean that all of them want to live in Italy or that all of them maintain the same relationship with Italian culture. It does mean, however, that there is a population whose integration, in many cases, would begin from a very different starting point from that of someone arriving without any previous historical or family connection to Italian territory.

Some of these people, once formally declared Italian, could choose to live in Italy. They could work, open businesses, invest, restore properties, raise children and contribute precisely to those municipalities and areas that are currently losing population. They could form part of the response to the same demographic crisis that the country is also trying to offset through new migration flows.

This is not to say that descendants could replace immigration. That would be an oversimplification. It is simply to recognise that Italy also has this possibility available and does not seem to consider it with the seriousness it deserves.

An opportunity Italy already reduced in 2025

The 2025 reform significantly reduced the possibility of recognising iure sanguinis citizenship in new situations. In doing so, Italy weakened one of the main legal bridges connecting the country with its own diaspora.

There are still, however, proceedings initiated under the previous legal regime. When they are protected by the transitional rules and the requirements established by law are met, those cases can still lead to a formal declaration of Italian citizenship.

These people should not be seen only as part of the judicial backlog. In a country that is losing population, they also represent a concrete possibility of return.

The State could resolve these proceedings more efficiently and then create policies aimed at those who wish to turn citizenship into an effective presence in the country. It could encourage settlement in municipalities affected by depopulation, facilitate professional and business activity and reconnect these families with the regions from which their ancestors once departed.

Brescia makes a choice of priorities visible

The Brescia order should not be used to accuse the judge or to place responsibility on asylum seekers. The issue is institutional.

The document refers to the new European migration and asylum framework. It refers to the Court’s priority organisational needs. It lists proceedings that were already pending. And it sets a new hearing date, 8 July 2027.

Italy must comply with its European obligations. But it should do so without turning into a secondary matter the situation of people who have already been waiting for years for a decision on their citizenship.

If there is urgency in managing new migration flows, there should also be urgency in not losing those who may still be declared Italian and who could, potentially, return, reside, work and build their future in the country.

The contradiction is difficult to ignore. Italy is receiving projections of a future with millions fewer inhabitants, is seeking new people to sustain its economy and its territories and, at the same time, is delaying the resolution of proceedings brought by descendants who have already turned to its courts to be formally declared Italian.

Some will never come to live here. Others might.

A country that is emptying out should, at the very least, be interested in knowing how many of them still wish to return.

May justice be done.